WITTGENSTEIN ON THE ATTRIBUTION OF MEANING TO TERMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to provide an exegetical analysis of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language as presented in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Philosophical Investigations. While the traditional interpretation assumes a strict division between an “early” and a “late” Wittgenstein, this paper critically examines this distinction. Through textual analysis of selected fragments, it is argued that there is no radical discontinuity, but rather a continuity of thought: (1) certain elements of the Tractatus may be read as anticipations of later views, while (2) parts of the Philosophical Investigations can be understood as supplements or modifications of earlier doctrines.
Special attention is given to Wittgenstein’s notions of “picture,” “proposition,” and “paradigm,” which reveal significant conceptual overlaps across the two works. Moreover, the discussion of emotions—such as the attribution of pain—illustrates the strongest point of convergence. In both works, meaning is grounded in external, observable manifestations: in the Tractatus, the correlation between picture, proposition, and state of affairs, and in the Investigations, the agreement established through shared criteria of use.
The results of this analysis indicate that Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language develops along a line of inquiry rather than being split into two incompatible phases. One of the main implications is the need to reconsider the standard framework of interpretation: instead of a narrative of existing gap, Wittgenstein’s work may be approached as a unified investigation into the attribution of meaning within language.